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The problems associated with what, in this article, I will call “discriminatory charitable trusts” are not new to equity. However, 
in the twenty-first century they have assumed, and may be expected to 
continue to assume, greater importance than ever before. In various 
jurisdictions in which the political community has organised along 
broadly liberal lines, equitable responses to discriminatory charitable 
trusts now play out against a backdrop of human rights law, the 
constitutional expression of anti-discrimination norms, and a public 
culture in which tolerance of discrimination on grounds like race, sex, 
and religion is at its lowest point in human history. Such responses also 
take their place within legal and intellectual frameworks in which there 
is growing scepticism about the plausibility of distinctions between 
“public” and “private” spheres and “public” and “private” law. In utilising 
extant doctrinal themes to fashion just solutions to old problems, judges 
exercising equitable jurisdiction who must deal with discriminatory 
charitable trusts are presented with challenges that they have not 
traditionally faced.
With such challenges in view, this article will focus on the two main 
doctrinal themes available to judges in equity who are asked to determine 
whether discriminatory charitable trusts should be interfered with on 
account of their discriminatory character. The two themes are public 
policy and public benefit. In Part II of the article, I consider the theme 
of public policy. I review how this theme has been deployed in cases 
about discriminatory trusts, charitable and “private”, before turning to 
some theoretical considerations that bear on the proper application of 
the public policy doctrine in such cases. I conclude that more work must 
be done if the theme of public policy is to be rendered appropriately 
sensitive to normative considerations underpinning it in cases about 
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discriminatory charitable trusts. In Part III, I turn to the theme of public 
benefit. I argue that, although the public benefit test applied in equity 
when working out whether a trust is for a charitable purpose is, perhaps 
surprisingly, scarcely used in responding to discriminatory charitable 
trusts, it has considerable potential as a tool for judges seeking to respond 
in nuanced ways to such trusts. In Part IV, I conclude by offering some 
thoughts as to whether judges should opt for the theme of public policy 
or the theme of public benefit when deliberating about discriminatory 
charitable trusts.
At the outset, two points of clarification are in order. First, when I 
refer to “discriminatory” trusts, I have in mind trusts the terms of which 
explicitly mete out unfavourable treatment to some class of persons based 
on the fact that the class shares an element or elements of human identity. 
However, I make no attempt to describe or explain the circumstances 
in which such discrimination ought to be of moral or legal concern.1 
Instead, I rely on what I take to be the intuitive proposition that at least 
some instances of such discrimination ought to be of both moral and 
legal concern, and I assume that this proposition is sufficient to animate 
my arguments in this paper. Secondly, when I refer to discriminatory 
“charitable” trusts, I describe such trusts as charitable in a provisional 
sense only; I mean to refer to the fact that those trusts are for purposes that 
are charitable purposes except for the fact that they entail discrimination. 
Thus, I leave open the possibility that such trusts, once the discriminatory 
character of their purposes is brought into view, might turn out not to 
be charitable all things considered. Moreover, I do not enter into debates 
about whether the appropriate response to discriminatory charitable 
trusts is to declare them invalid or to vary their terms cy-près: instead, I 
pose questions at a higher level of generality about whether such trusts 
ought to be “interfered” with in one or another way.
1. I do attempt such arguments elsewhere: see Matthew Harding, Charity 
Law and the Liberal State (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014) 
ch 7 [Harding, Charity Law].
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II. Public Policy
The most prominent theme in equitable responses to discriminatory 
charitable trusts is the theme of public policy. In cases about 
discriminatory charitable trusts where judges deploy this theme in their 
reasoning, they typically seek to ascertain whether or not the trust in 
question offends the doctrine according to which dispositions may be 
interfered with, including struck down altogether, on grounds of public 
policy. An investigation into public policy in relation to a discriminatory 
charitable trust usually entails some assessment of the extent to which 
equality norms inform public policy, along with an effort to balance such 
norms against the freedom of disposition of the settlor of the trust. In this 
part, I consider what the case law reveals about how judges work with 
the theme of public policy when dealing with discriminatory charitable 
trusts, before undertaking a critical analysis of that case law.
Cases in which judges have been asked to interfere with discriminatory 
charitable trusts on public policy grounds are not numerous. Nonetheless, 
such cases tend to support the proposition that, traditionally at least, 
judges have been reluctant to invoke the public policy doctrine against 
discriminatory charitable trusts. In England, although judges have shown 
themselves willing to order cy-près variation of discriminatory charitable 
trusts,2 they have never made such orders explicitly on public policy 
grounds. For example, in Re Lysaght, a testamentary gift was made to the 
Royal College of Surgeons for the purpose of providing scholarships to 
medical students; its terms discriminated against Roman Catholic and 
Jewish students.3 Justice Buckley said that it would be “going much too 
far” to say that the trust was contrary to public policy,4 but he nonetheless 
approved a cy-près scheme excising the discriminatory terms because the 
testatrix’s intention was that the trust be administered by the College, and 
the College would not accept the gift unless the trust was rendered non-
2. See also In Re Harding, [2007] EWHC 3 (Ch)(where a discriminatory 
charitable trust was varied on statutory grounds).
3. [1966] Ch 191 (Eng) [Re Lysaght].
4. Ibid at 206.
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discriminatory in relation to religion.5 In Australia too, a recent decision 
of the Supreme Court of New South Wales also reveals judicial reluctance 
to deploy the public policy tool against a discriminatory charitable trust. 
In Kay v South Eastern Sydney Area Health Service 6 (“Kay”), a testamentary 
gift for the treatment of “White babies” was upheld,7 Chief Justice 
Young in equity saying only that “generally speaking testators can be as 
capricious as they like and … if they wish to benefit a charity in respect 
of, or [sic] even of, a discriminatory group, they are at liberty to do so”.8 
These cases reveal judges balancing freedom of disposition and equality 
in the setting of the public policy doctrine by assuming that freedom of 
disposition outweighs equality.
The traditional reluctance of judges to interfere with discriminatory 
charitable trusts on public policy grounds has been accompanied by an 
even more pronounced judicial reluctance to invoke the public policy 
doctrine against discriminatory “private” trusts. There is, as is well known, 
a long tradition of judges interfering with dispositions for reasons of public 
policy.9 At the same time, there is a long, if poorly understood, tradition 
of judges recognising equality norms within the public policy doctrine.10 
Nonetheless, in cases of “private” trusts, viz., trusts whose objects are 
persons identified by name or ascertainable by reference to a described 
class, courts have traditionally refused to invoke public policy to respond 
5. Ibid at 209. See also Re Dominion Students’ Hall Trust, [1947] 1 Ch 183 
(Eng); Re Meres’ Will Trusts (1957)(Ch (Eng)), cited in “Law Report, May 
3”, The Times (3 May 1957) 10. 
6. [2003] NSWSC 292 (Austl).
7. Ibid at para 2 (in the will, the testatrix had underlined the word “White” 
twice).
8. Ibid at para 18. Compare Home for Incurables of Baltimore City v 
University of Maryland Medical System Corporation, 797 A (2d) 746 (Md 
Ct App 2002 (US))(and thanks to Evelyn Brody for bringing that case to 
my attention).
9. I note relevant cases in Matthew Harding, “Some Arguments against 
Discriminatory Gifts and Trusts” (2011) 31:2 Oxford Journal of Legal 
Studies 303 at 310-11 [Harding, “Some Arguments”].
10. See Peter Benson, “Equality of Opportunity and Private Law” in Daniel 
Friedman & Daphne Barak-Erez, eds, Human Rights in Private Law 
(Portland: Hart Publishing, 2001) 201 at 209.
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to any discrimination entailed in the terms of the trusts in question.11 In 
withholding the public policy tool in such cases, courts have resolved a 
perceived competition between freedom of disposition and equality by 
finding that freedom of disposition prevails. A good illustration of this is 
Blathwayt v Baron Cawley.12 There, a testamentary disposition in terms 
that discriminated against Roman Catholics was upheld notwithstanding 
its discriminatory character. In upholding the disposition, members of 
the House of Lords noted the equality interest of the class affected by 
the discrimination, and acknowledged that equality norms informed 
public policy in England. However, their Lordships thought that, on the 
facts of the case, any such equality norms were clearly outweighed by 
the testator’s freedom of disposition.13 For Lord Wilberforce, “neither by 
express provision nor by implication has private selection yet become a 
matter of public policy”.14
The traditional judicial tolerance towards discriminatory charitable 
and “private” trusts has been unsettled in recent decades in two 
jurisdictions: Canada and South Africa. In Canada, the key case, decided 
in 1990, is Canada Trust Co v Ontario (Human Rights Commission)15 
(“Canada Trust”). The trust in question, the Leonard Foundation, was 
settled by a prominent Canadian in the 1920s to fund educational 
scholarships; the recitals and provisions of the trust deed made clear, 
in unmistakably bigoted terms, that the scholarships were not to be 
awarded except to white Protestants of British nationality or “parentage”. 
The trust deed also stipulated that no more than a quarter of available 
funds should be paid each year to female candidates, and it contained 
terms that discriminated against other candidates on grounds of parental 
11. Judges have been more willing to interfere with such trusts where their 
discriminatory terms take the form of uncertain conditions: see Harding, 
“Some Arguments”, supra note 9 at 307-10 for a discussion of relevant 
cases.
12. [1976] AC 397 (HL) [Blathwayt]. I discuss other illustrative cases in 
Harding, “Some Arguments”, supra note 9 at 304-305.
13. Blathwayt, supra note 11 at 425-26, per Lord Wilberforce; 429, per Lord 
Cross; 441, per Lord Edmund-Davies.
14. Ibid at 426.
15. (1990), 69 DLR (4th) 321 (Ont CA) [Canada Trust].
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occupation.16 In response to public pressure, the trustee of the Leonard 
Foundation applied for judicial directions as to the validity of the trust. 
At first instance, the trust was found not to offend public policy,17 but 
the Ontario Court of Appeal ordered a cy-près scheme excising the terms 
of the trust deed that discriminated on grounds of race, sex, nationality, 
and religion.18 In that decision, all the members of the Court thought 
that the terms of the trust offended public policy and should be varied 
on that basis.
A majority of the Court framed the relevant question for decision as 
one that demanded a balancing of freedom of disposition and equality 
via the public policy doctrine. Justice Robins noted the significance 
of freedom of disposition in Canadian law,19 but he went on to state 
that equality norms inform Canadian public policy in important ways, 
in light of the diverse character of Canadian society and the nation’s 
constitutional commitments.20 For Robins JA:
[t]he settlor’s freedom to dispose of his property through the creation of a 
charitable trust fashioned along these lines must give way to current principles 
of public policy under which all races and religions are to be treated on a 
footing of equality and accorded equal regard and equal respect.21
In this and other passages22 Robins JA seemed to say that equality may 
outweigh freedom of disposition not only in the case of a discriminatory 
charitable trust, such as the Leonard Foundation, but also in the case 
16. The relevant provisions of the trust deed are set out ibid at 326-29. 
Eligibility to participate in the management of the trust was also restricted 
based on race, nationality and religion.
17. Canada Trust Co v Ontario (Human Rights Commission)(1987), 61 OR 
(2d) 75 (H Ct  J).
18. The provisions that discriminated on grounds of parental occupation were 
left undisturbed.
19. Canada Trust, supra note 15 at 334.
20. Ibid at 334-35.
21. Ibid at 335.
22. See also ibid (“[t]he freedom of an owner of property to dispose of his or 
her property as he or she chooses is an important social interest that has 
long been recognised in our society and is firmly rooted in our law … 
That interest must, however, be limited in the case of this trust by public 
policy considerations” at 334).
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of a discriminatory “private” trust. The majority judgment in Canada 
Trust may thus be read as a radical departure from the traditional judicial 
reluctance to invoke public policy against discriminatory “private” trusts, 
and there is evidence that Canadian courts have read the judgment in this 
way since Canada Trust was decided.23
In his concurring judgment in Canada Trust, Justice Tarnopolsky 
joined with the majority in conceiving of the question for decision as 
one that required a balancing of freedom of disposition and equality via 
the public policy doctrine. Like the majority, Tarnopolsky JA ruled that 
Canadian public policy entailed equality norms;24 like the majority, he 
also acknowledged the importance of freedom of disposition to the law:25
[i]n this case the court must, as it does in so many areas of law, engage in 
a balancing process. Important as it is to permit individuals to dispose of 
their property as they see fit, it cannot be an absolute right. The law imposes 
restrictions on freedom of both contract and testamentary disposition.26
However, while Tarnopolsky JA agreed with the majority that a balancing 
exercise was necessary, he seems to have disagreed with the majority on 
the right way to balance freedom of disposition and equality in cases of 
discriminatory “private” trusts. He stated that:
[t]his decision does not affect private, family trusts. By that I mean that it 
does not affect testamentary dispositions or outright gifts that are not also 
charitable trusts. Historically, charitable trusts have received special protection 
… This preferential treatment is justified on the ground that charitable trusts 
are dedicated to the benefit of the community … It is the public nature of 
charitable trusts which attracts the requirement that they conform to the 
public policy against discrimination.27
23. See McCorkill v Streed, 2014 NBQB 148; Spence v BMO Trust Company, 
2015 ONSC 615. Perhaps ironically, Canadian courts have proven 
less willing to interfere with discriminatory charitable trusts on public 
policy grounds in the years since Canada Trust was decided: see Re 
Ramsden Estate (1996), 139 DLR (4th) 746 (PESC (TD)) [Re Ramsden 
Estate]; University of Victoria v British Columbia (AG), 2000 BCSC 445 
[University of Victoria]; Re The Esther G Castanera Scholarship Fund, 2015 
MBQB 28 [Castanera]. I discuss the latter three cases below.
24. Canada Trust, supra note 15 at 348-52.




For Tarnopolsky JA, it was because charitable trusts are in some 
relevant sense “public” trusts that freedom of disposition and equality in 
cases of discriminatory charitable trusts are to be balanced in favour of 
equality.28
Also at odds with the traditional judicial reluctance to invoke public 
policy against discriminatory trusts is recent South African jurisprudence. 
While these South African developments are not, strictly speaking, 
developments in equity — South Africa has no tradition of equity — 
they are of obvious relevance for those jurisdictions where discriminatory 
trusts fall to be considered by judges exercising equitable jurisdiction. 
Prior to South Africa’s current constitutional settlement, South African 
courts were loath to interfere with such trusts on public policy, or “boni 
mores”, grounds;29 as François du Toit points out in his important work 
on the subject, there are reasons to think that historically freedom of 
disposition has been prized in South Africa even more than in the 
common law world.30 However, all that changed with the coming into 
effect of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.31 According 
to section 9(4) of the Constitution of South Africa, constitutionally 
protected equality rights may be enforced by citizens against each other 
28. See further Harding, Charity Law, supra note 1 at 215-16.
29. Although see Ex parte President of the Conference of the Methodist 
Church of Southern Africa NO: In re William Marsh Will Trust, [1993] 
2 SA 697 (Cape Prov Div)(decided under s 13 of the Trust Property 
Control Act, 1988 (SA) No 57 of 1988 [Trust Property Control Act]). 
The section “empowers a court to vary any trust provision where such 
provision occasions consequences which, in the opinion of the court, 
the trust founder failed to contemplate or foresee … and such provision 
is, inter alia, in conflict with the public interest”: François du Toit, 
“Constitutionalism, Public Policy and Discriminatory Testamentary 
Bequests; A Good Fit between Common Law and Civil Law in South 
Africa’s Mixed Jurisdiction” (2012) 27 Tulane European and Civil Law 
Forum 97 at 111 [du Toit, “A Good Fit”]. The inquiry into “public 
interest” for the purposes of s 13 is similar to the inquiry under the public 
policy doctrine.
30. du Toit, “A Good Fit”, ibid at 114-16.
31. No 108 of 1996 [Constitution of South Africa].
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as well as against the state;32 this provision led commentators, including 
du Toit, to argue in the years following the new constitutional settlement 
that some previously uncontroversial discriminatory dispositions would 
no longer survive the scrutiny of South African courts.33 And those 
predictions have indeed been borne out in the post-1996 jurisprudence; 
South African courts are now willing to interfere with discriminatory 
trusts on public policy grounds.34 At the same time though, freedom 
of disposition, at least in a testamentary setting, has been placed on a 
constitutional footing as well, a matter to which I return below.
In South Africa, the first post-1996 case to deal with a discriminatory 
trust was Minister for Education v Syfrets Trust Ltd NO35 (“Minister for 
Education”). There, the terms of a testamentary trust for the purpose of 
funding educational scholarships discriminated against non-Europeans, 
Jews and women. Justice Griesel of the High Court of South Africa was 
asked to order that the offending provisions of the will be deleted, so 
that the trust could be administered in a non-discriminatory fashion. 
Justice Griesel granted the order. Rather than dealing with the case as 
one requiring an enforcement of the equality rights set out in section 
9(4) of the Constitution,36 Griesel J applied the public policy doctrine.37 
He spelled out the ways in which the equality norms enshrined in the 
Constitution now informed and gave content to public policy in South 
32. See also Promotion of Equality and Prevention of Unfair Discrimination Act 
(SA), Act 4 of 2000.
33. See François du Toit, “The Constitutionally Bound Dead Hand? The 
Impact of Constitutional Rights and Principles on Freedom of Testation 
in South African Law” (2001) 12:2 Stellenbosch Law Review 222, and the 
sources cited therein.
34. And recently, it seems, via direct application of the equality provisions 
of the Constitution: see Fatima Schroeder, “Whites-only Bursaries to be 
Scrapped”, Iol News (25 April 2015), online: iol news <www.iol.co.za/
news/south-africa>. I am grateful to Marius de Waal for alerting me to 
this case; written reasons for the decision had not been published when 
this article went to press.
35. Minister for Education v Syfrets Trust Ltd NO, [2006] ZAWCHC 65 (SA)
[Minister for Education].
36. As he had been invited to do: ibid at para 9.
37. Ibid at para 16.
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Africa.38 Justice Griesel was of the view that those public policy-informing 
equality norms outweighed the freedom of disposition of the testator, in 
light of the fundamental nature of the commitment of the South African 
polity to equality in the Constitution.39 This approach was also taken in 
Curators Ad Litem to Certain Beneficiaries of Emma Smith Educational 
Fund v The University of KwaZulu-Natal,40 in which the Supreme Court 
of Appeal appealed to “the fundamental values of our Constitution and 
the constitutional imperative to move away from our racially divided 
past” in upholding an order varying the terms of another discriminatory 
trust for funding educational scholarships.41
Another recent South African case to deal with a discriminatory trust 
is BoE Trust Limited NO42 (“BoE Trust”). The terms of a testamentary 
trust, once again for the purpose of funding educational scholarships, 
discriminated against students who were not “White”. The testatrix 
had also made provision in the will that, “[i]n the event that it should 
become impossible for my trustee[s] to carry out the terms of the trust”, 
the income of the trust should be paid to certain named charities.43 
The terms of the educational trust required that professors from four 
named universities participate in its management; the universities in 
question refused to participate as long as the trust contained a racially 
discriminatory provision.44 The trustees therefore sought an order 
deleting the provision in question. The Supreme Court of Appeal refused 
to grant the order. In doing so, the Court ruled that freedom of testation 
is the subject of a right protected by section 25(1) of the South African 
Constitution,45 a proposition that Griesel J had assumed to be correct in 
38. Ibid at paras 23-32.
39. Ibid at paras 39-46. Also relevant was that the trust was to be 
administered by a public body, viz., a university, ibid at para 45.
40. [2010] ZASCA 136 (SA).
41. Ibid at para 42. The order had been made under section 13 of the Trust 
Property Control Act, supra note 29.
42. [2012] ZASCA 147 (SA) [BoE Trust].
43. Ibid at para 3.
44. Ibid at paras 3, 7-9.
45. Ibid at paras 26-27.
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Minister for Education but had not ruled on.46 Significantly, the Court 
also linked freedom of testation to “ … the founding constitutional 
principle of human dignity. The right to dignity allows the living, and 
the dying, the peace of mind of knowing that their last wishes would be 
respected after they have passed away”.47
Immediately prior to affirming that the right to freedom of testation 
is protected by the Constitution, the Court issued this statement:
[t]he giving of the bursaries as [the testatrix] had intended had become 
impossible as a result of the universities’ stance. Must the alternative provided 
in the will be given effect to? Does [the testatrix’s] right to dispose of her assets 
as she saw fit, whether we agree with her exercise of that right or not, require a 
court to see at least whether there is a way in which to interpret her will so as 
that it does not offend public policy?48
Having posed those questions, the Court answered them by giving effect 
to the provision of the will that was conditional on the educational trust 
being impossible to carry out.49 Rather than resolving the competition 
between freedom of disposition and equality that was raised by the 
educational trust, the Court, thanks to the provisions of the will, was able 
to sidestep that competition altogether. In one sense, for the Court to 
have given effect to the terms of the will in that way seems unremarkable; 
at the same time though, there are reasons to worry about the Court’s 
emphasis on freedom of testation, and I return to these shortly.
As the case law shows, the public policy doctrine is a useful tool 
for judges who seek to balance the demands of freedom of disposition 
and equality in responding to discriminatory trusts. The doctrine is an 
especially useful tool for judges in jurisdictions where equality norms 
figure in the Constitution, as the South African jurisprudence amply 
demonstrates; through the doctrine, judges may draw on constitutional 
equality norms in giving content to equity according to orthodox methods 
of judicial reasoning.50 That said, invocation of the theme of public 
46. Minister for Education, supra note 35 at para 18.
47. BoE Trust, supra note 42 at para 27.
48. Ibid at para 25.
49. Ibid at paras 30-31.
50. For fuller discussion, see Harding, “Some Arguments”, supra note 9 at 
310-16.
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policy in cases of discriminatory trusts raises questions that demand 
careful scrutiny, and these questions have not, to date, received sufficient 
answers in the case law. Perhaps the most pressing of these questions 
might be stated as follows: does public policy demand that freedom 
of disposition and equality be balanced in respect of discriminatory 
charitable trusts differently than in respect of discriminatory “private” 
trusts? According to the traditional view, the answer is no: public policy 
demands that freedom of disposition should prevail in respect of both 
types of trust. According to the majority in Canada Trust and, it would 
seem, recent South African jurisprudence, the answer is also no, but in 
a different way: public policy demands that equality norms prevail over 
freedom of disposition in respect of both charitable and “private” trusts 
that discriminate.51 According to Tarnopolsky JA in Canada Trust, on the 
other hand, the answer is yes: charitable trusts, because they are in some 
relevant sense “public” trusts, are susceptible to equality norms in ways 
that “private” trusts are not. Which view is to be preferred?
One theoretical effort to address this question is to be found in the 
work of Lorraine Weinrib and Ernest Weinrib.52 The Weinribs begin with 
the proposition that certain values underpin and animate the entire legal 
order, including private law, of which the law of trusts and equity more 
generally are a part.53 The Weinribs, writing in a Canadian setting, locate 
these values in the written constitution,54 but nothing in the Weinribs’ 
analysis precludes the possibility that the values might emerge from 
judge-made law. The important point is that the values are foundational 
and affect private law. In the Weinribs’ view, in a jurisdiction where 
51. The South African cases discussed above were about discriminatory 
charitable trusts. However, their reasoning seems clearly applicable to 
discriminatory “private” trusts as well.
52. Lorraine E Weinrib & Ernest J Weinrib, “Constitutional Values and 
Private Law in Canada” in Daniel Friedman & Daphne Barak-Erez, eds, 
Human Rights and Private Law (Portland: Hart Publishing, 2001) 43 
[Weinrib & Weinrib, “Constitutional Values”].
53. Ibid at 50-51.
54. This is in keeping with Canadian jurisprudence: see Retail, Wholesale and 
Department Store Union, Local 580 v Dolphin Delivery Ltd, [1986] 2 SCR 
573; Hill v Church of Scientology, [1995] 2 SCR 1130.
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such foundational values include equality norms, those equality norms 
affect private law, and private law must be appropriately sensitive to 
them. At the same time though, the Weinribs point out that private 
law must be sensitive to freedom of disposition, and it may be assumed 
that they regard this freedom also as a fundamental value underpinning 
the legal system.55 Again, this value might have recognition in a written 
constitution — as is the case in South Africa with regard to freedom of 
testation, as we saw earlier — or it might emerge from judge-made law; 
again, the important point is that the value of freedom of disposition 
is fundamental and affects private law. In a jurisdiction where equality 
norms and freedom of disposition constitute fundamental values of the 
legal system, the Weinribs appear to think that the appropriate legal 
response to discriminatory trusts demands that the right balance be 
struck between those values.56
The Weinribs argue that such a balancing exercise must be carried out 
according to what they call a “proportionality” principle;57 they describe 
the principle in the following passage:
[a] central aspect of one normative principle is granted priority over a 
comparatively more marginal aspect of another. Relevant to this exercise would 
be a comparison of the principles that favour the two parties, in which one asks 
whether the triumph of the plaintiff’s principle would impact more heavily on 
the defendant’s than the triumph of the defendant’s principle would impact on 
the plaintiff’s.58
According to the Weinribs, when applied to discriminatory “private” 
trusts, this principle demands that freedom of disposition prevail. The 
Weinribs argue that for such a trust to be interfered with owing to its 
discriminatory character would be to disturb freedom of disposition 
in a disproportionate way; after all, they say, freedom of disposition in 
a “private” trust is precisely the freedom to choose between different 
possible beneficiaries in ways that discriminate between them.59 For the 
Weinribs, matters are otherwise in the case of a discriminatory charitable 
55. Weinrib & Weinrib, “Constitutional Values”, supra note 52 at 68.
56. Ibid at 57-59.
57. Ibid at 57.
58. Ibid at 58.
59. Ibid at 68.
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trust. In such a case, freedom of disposition is exercised to give effect to 
a public benefit purpose, and, to that extent, to subject that exercise of 
dispositive freedom to equality norms that operate in the public sphere is 
consistent with the choices entailed in it.60
If the Weinribs’ view of how freedom of disposition and equality 
should be balanced in cases of discriminatory trusts is sound, then 
Tarnopolsky JA seems to have been on the right track when, in Canada 
Trust, he drew a distinction between charitable and “private” trusts that 
discriminate and found that only trusts of the former type should be 
interfered with on public policy grounds. But embedded in the Weinribs’ 
view is a contestable understanding of the value of freedom of disposition 
that should be exposed and scrutinised before the view is accepted as 
sound. The Weinribs seem to assume that freedom of disposition is 
valuable because and to the extent that the disponor chooses the objects 
of her disposition, whether those objects be persons or purposes. On 
this view, the meanings and consequences of the disponor’s choice, along 
with the identity and character of objects of that choice — what may 
compendiously, if somewhat tendentiously, be called the expressive and 
teleological aspects of the choice — are of no relevance to understanding 
the sense in which the freedom to make the choice is valuable. It follows 
that such expressive and teleological aspects of disponors’ choices are 
irrelevant to understanding the value of freedom of disposition in cases 
of discriminatory trusts. Among the irrelevant considerations might be 
that the expression of a disponor’s choice demeans some identity-based 
group, or that a historically disadvantaged class is placed at a relative 
disadvantage by the choice in question.
The Weinribs’ assumption that the value of freedom of disposition 
inheres in choice itself is consistent with a particular view of the moral 
practice of private law, a view that Ernest Weinrib has explored more fully 
in his other work.61 According to that view, expressive and teleological 
considerations ought to play no role in private law. Rather, private law 
should be confined to the public enforcement of the demands of right 
60. Ibid.
61. Ernest J Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law, 2d (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2012) [Weinrib, Private Law].
242 
 
Harding, Charitable Trusts and Discrimination
understood according to the moral theory of Immanuel Kant;62 from 
a Kantian perspective, the demands of right are demands that a legal 
framework enable each person to act freely and purposively in the world 
consistent with the free and purposive action of each other person.63 The 
demands of right are therefore agnostic as to expressive and teleological 
dimensions of free and purposive choice; it is free and purposive choice 
itself that matters. And it follows that, within the moral practice of 
private law, choice may be treated as valuable in itself, irrespective of its 
expressive or teleological dimensions, so long as it is consistent with the 
demands of Kantian right.64 Thus the legal system may, indeed should, 
constrain choices that dominate or coerce others, but there is no moral 
requirement that the legal system constrain choices that discriminate 
against others on grounds relating to their identity.
The Weinribs’ assumption that the value of freedom of disposition 
inheres in choice itself is not self-evident; neither is the Kantian account 
of the moral practice of private law, which animates that assumption. 
Thus, the Weinribs should provide some argument to support the 
proposition that private law is a moral practice confined to giving effect 
to Kantian right; and in the absence of such an argument, the Weinribs’ 
contestable assumption about the value of freedom of disposition should 
not be accepted. It has been well explained elsewhere why the arguments 
that Ernest Weinrib provides for his interpretation of private law are 
62. In their jointly authored piece, the Weinribs talk about the principle of 
“transactional equality”; this principle appears to refer to the demands of 
Kantian right: Weinrib & Weinrib, “Constitutional Values”, supra note 52 
at 58 and passim.
63. On the demands of Kantian right, see also Arthur Ripstein, Force and 
Freedom: Kant’s Legal and Political Philosophy (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 2009).
64. I say “treated as valuable” because, in a sense, from the perspective of 
Kantian right questions of value are altogether irrelevant to the question 
whether the law should facilitate or constrain freedom of disposition: 
Weinrib, Private Law, supra note 61 at 109-13. From this perspective, 
to ask about the “value” of freedom of disposition is to ask the wrong 
question. Nonetheless, for ease of expression I refer in the text to freedom 
of disposition as a “value” even when referring to the Weinribs’ ideas.
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unconvincing.65 Moreover, there are plausible alternative accounts of 
private law according to which private law should take an interest in 
the expressive and teleological dimensions of choices, even though those 
choices are consistent with the demands of Kantian right.66 I therefore 
want to proceed by insisting that the value of freedom of disposition may 
depend in important ways on just the sorts of considerations — relating 
to the expressive and teleological dimensions of the choices entailed 
in exercises of that freedom — that the Weinribs rule out of play in 
their treatment of that value. In particular, some exercises of freedom 
of disposition might turn out to lack value in certain ways where they 
entail choices to settle trusts on discriminatory terms. And in extreme 
cases of such value-lacking exercises of dispositive freedom, a balancing 
of the values of freedom of disposition and equality might turn out to 
be inappropriate, because there might be nothing of value to place on 
the scales on the “freedom of disposition” side. In those extreme cases, 
it might be misleading to say that discriminatory trusts offend public 
policy in spite of the value of freedom of disposition; it might be more 
accurate to say that discriminatory trusts both offend public policy and 
are products of valueless exercises of dispositive freedom.
To illustrate these points about extreme cases, consider an example 
of a discriminatory disposition from beyond the law of trusts: the 
discriminatory restrictive covenant in the Canadian case of Re Noble and 
Wolf.67 The covenant in question purported to prohibit the sale of land 
to “any person of the Jewish, Hebrew, Semitic, Negro or coloured race or 
blood”.68 Was the exercise of freedom of disposition entailed in binding 
a purchaser of land to this covenant a valuable one? The Weinribs seem 
65. See e.g. Hanoch Dagan, “The Limited Autonomy of Private Law” (2008) 
56:3 American Journal of Comparative Law 809.
66. For example, accounts informed by higher order teleological accounts of 
political morality: for two such higher order accounts see John Finnis, 
Natural Law and Natural Rights, 2d (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2011); Joseph Raz, The Morality of Freedom (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1986).
67. [1949] OR 503 (CA) [Re Noble and Wolf].
68. Ibid at 513.
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to suggest not in their discussion of the case.69 And yet according to the 
Weinribs’ own understanding of the value of freedom of disposition, it 
seems that a choice to dispose of land on the terms of the covenant in Re 
Noble and Wolf may be treated in law as valuable because it is consistent 
with the demands of Kantian right; to that extent, the choice may be 
weighed in the balance against equality norms in working out whether 
or not to enforce the covenant. Moreover, according to the Weinribs’ 
understanding of the value of dispositive freedom, it seems that the 
balancing exercise should be determined by giving effect to the disponor’s 
choice because any other result would interfere disproportionately with 
the value of freedom of disposition. This reflects in substance the position 
taken by the Ontario Court of Appeal, members of which appealed to 
the “sanctity” or “liberty” of contract in upholding the covenant in 
question.70 But the Weinribs’ reaction to the case seems the right one 
notwithstanding their theoretical commitments, once it is accepted 
that the expressive and teleological dimensions of choices may be taken 
into account in assessing their value. On this view, that the covenant 
expressed a bigoted contempt for certain religious and racial groups, and 
that it was directed at excluding members of those groups from living in 
a particular residential community, combine to suggest that the covenant 
was the product of a valueless exercise of dispositive freedom and one that 
merited no legal protection or concern.71
Extreme cases like Re Noble and Wolf show that where judges share 
the Weinribs’ contestable assumption about the value of freedom of 
69. Weinrib & Weinrib, “Constitutional Values”, supra note 52 at 63.
70. Re Noble and Wolf, supra note 67 at 524 per Justice Henderson, 530 per 
Justice Hogg. The case went on appeal to the Supreme Court of Canada, 
where the covenant was struck down, but not on public policy grounds: 
Noble v Alley, [1951] SCR 64.
71. From this perspective, it is a matter for regret that in Re Noble and Wolf 
the Court departed from the earlier decision of Justice Mackay of the 
Ontario High Court in Re Drummond Wren, [1945] OR 778 (HC), 
striking down a similar discriminatory restrictive covenant on public 
policy grounds. In the law of Ontario today, discriminatory restrictive 
covenants are void under section 22 of the Conveyancing and Law of 
Property Act, RSO 1990, c C-34.
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disposition, they may attribute weight to the value of freedom of 
disposition in the setting of the public policy doctrine even though that 
value should be given no weight in the circumstances. And, of particular 
relevance to this paper, the possibility of such extreme cases calls into 
question the willingness of courts to attribute weight to freedom of 
disposition as well as equality when applying the public policy doctrine 
in cases about discriminatory trusts. Courts have shown this willingness 
not only in jurisdictions like England and Australia where such trusts 
have been upheld, but also in jurisdictions like Canada and South Africa 
where such trusts have been interfered with on public policy grounds. For 
example, recall the emphasis on freedom of testation in the South African 
case of BoE Trust and the unquestioning association of that value with 
the fundamental constitutional value of human dignity. This emphasis 
seems at odds with the proposition that, in some cases, a bigoted and 
offensive exercise of freedom of testation might be utterly without value 
and deserving of no legal protection or concern. In such cases, a South 
African court might do better to assert that the exercise of testamentary 
freedom is valueless and invoke the public policy rule against it on that 
basis.
At this point, it must be noticed that extreme cases like Re Noble and 
Wolf are rare. To begin with, it is unusual for a discriminatory disposition 
to be discriminatory in a way that ought to be of concern to the law. 
As the Weinribs point out, freedom of disposition just is the freedom 
to discriminate in choosing objects of the disposition, and most of the 
time such discrimination — for example, the choice of one child over 
another as heir, or the choice of a “relief of poverty” purpose over an 
“advancement of education” one — is and ought to be unremarkable 
from a legal point of view.72 Moreover, even in cases where dispositions do 
entail the sort of discrimination in which the law should take an interest, 
that discrimination is often plausibly construed as a means to bringing 
72. Although, in the case of the choice of one child over another as heir, see 
Spence, supra note 23.
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about a valuable state of affairs.73 And nowhere is this clearer than in the 
case of discriminatory charitable trusts. Such trusts are usually oriented 
to a purpose of a type recognised as prima facie charitable in law, but the 
class of persons who stand to benefit directly from that purpose being 
carried out is restricted in some way. That discriminatory charitable trusts 
typically have this profile may be illustrated even by cases of such trusts 
that discriminate in an egregious way, such as the trusts in Canada Trust 
and Kay. The most plausible construction of the terms of those trusts 
is that they were for “advancement of education” and “advancement of 
health” purposes respectively, rather than for the purpose of discriminating 
against the classes affected by their discriminatory terms.74
Where discriminatory trusts are the products of exercises of 
dispositive freedom that are valuable to some degree even though they 
entail discrimination, there is something to weigh on the scales on 
the “freedom of disposition” side when assessing whether such trusts 
offend public policy. This leads us back to a principle approximating the 
Weinribs’ principle of “proportionality”, according to which freedom of 
disposition and equality are to be balanced against each other. But if we 
reject the Weinribs’ contestable assumption about the value of freedom 
of disposition, the application of the principle of “proportionality” 
73. Thus, the testamentary disposition in Blathwayt may – and I stress, may 
– have had more to do with the testator’s loyal pride in the Protestantism 
of his aristocratic family than with bigoted prejudice against Roman 
Catholics: Blathwayt, supra note 12 at 426 per Lord Wilberforce, 429 per 
Lord Chelsea.
74. For a different view, see Adam Parachin, “Public Benefit, Discrimination 
and the Definition of Charity” in Kit Barker & Darryn Jensen, eds, 
Private Law: Key Encounters with Public Law (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2013) 171 at 199-200 [Parachin, “Public Benefit”]. Of 
course, a trust might be created for the purpose of discriminating against 
some group; a trust for the purpose of “promoting the subordination of 
women” might be offered as an example. Such a trust could not be called 
“charitable” even in a provisional sense; it would clearly fail the public 
benefit test on any reasonable view of that test. But attempts to create 
trusts for the purpose of discrimination, as opposed to trusts for purposes 
that entail discrimination, are not known to the case law and may be 
assumed to be exceedingly rare.
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must be sensitive to the fact that, in cases of discriminatory trusts, the 
proper balance between freedom of disposition and equality cannot 
be determined except with reference to the expressive and teleological 
dimensions of choices entailed in exercises of dispositive freedom. And 
this sensitivity is called for whether the balancing exercise is required 
in the setting of a charitable or a “private” trust. In a legal landscape 
in which the “proportionality” principle was applied in this way, a 
discriminatory charitable trust would not be susceptible to interference 
on public policy grounds solely because it was in some sense “public”; it 
would be susceptible to such interference to the extent that the exercise 
of dispositive freedom that brought it into existence lacked value. And 
a discriminatory “private” trust would be susceptible to interference for 
the same reason.
If the value of freedom of disposition is a function of expressive and 
teleological dimensions of the choices entailed in it, then there is work to 
be done developing the public policy doctrine so that it is more sensitive to 
that value. In Canada Trust, the majority barely engaged with normative 
considerations bearing on the value of dispositive freedom, simply stating 
that freedom of disposition was a value, that it must “give way” to equality 
norms on the facts of the case, and that to assert this was to “expatiate the 
obvious”.75 In particular, no real effort was made to explain why equality 
norms should prevail in Canada Trust despite the fact that the Leonard 
Foundation was a trust for the advancement of education and, to that 
extent, the product of a valuable exercise of dispositive freedom.76 And 
judges in subsequent Canadian cases about discriminatory trusts for 
the advancement of education have also shown little appetite to engage 
with the value of freedom of disposition.77 In Re Ramsden Estate, a case 
about a trust to provide scholarships to Protestant students, Canada Trust 
75. Canada Trust, supra note 15 at 321, 334.
76. See ibid at 333, per Robins JA (for the view that the trust was for the 
advancement of education). The criticism in the text may also be made 
of the decision of the US Supreme Court in Bob Jones University v US, 
461 US 574 (1983) [Bob Jones], and indeed was made by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist in his dissenting judgment in that case.
77. See the discussion in Parachin, “Public Benefit”, supra note 74 at 178-79.
248 
 
Harding, Charitable Trusts and Discrimination
was distinguished on the basis that the discrimination in Canada Trust 
was “blatant”.78 There was no attempt to investigate whether the value 
of freedom of disposition was to be understood differently in the two 
cases because of the character of the discrimination in each. Similarly, in 
University of Victoria v British Columbia (AG)79 (“University of Victoria”), 
a case about a trust for funding scholarships for Roman Catholic students, 
Canada Trust was distinguished because the discrimination in Canada 
Trust was thought to be “offensive” whereas the discrimination in the case 
at hand was not;80 but again the court declined to consider whether and 
why the value of freedom of disposition might be affected in some way by 
the fact that such freedom is exercised in an “offensive” fashion.
Re The Esther G Castanera Scholarship Fund81 (“Castanera”) is the 
most recent Canadian case raising a discriminatory charitable trust. In 
that case, a testamentary trust to provide financial support to women 
graduates of a particular high school undertaking tertiary studies 
in the sciences was in view.82 Unlike the judges in Re Ramsden Estate 
and University of Victoria, in Castanera, Justice Dewar of the Court of 
Queen’s Bench of Manitoba undertook a careful analysis of normative 
considerations bearing on the public policy doctrine as it applies to 
discriminatory charitable trusts. In this regard, Castanera represents 
an improvement on the earlier cases. That said, Dewar J seems to have 
thought that the motivations underpinning a discriminatory charitable 
trust are of normative significance in applying the public policy doctrine; 
thus, he drew attention to the bigoted motivations underpinning the 
discriminatory trust in Canada Trust, and he contrasted the benign 
motivations of the testatrix in the case at hand.83 But Dewar J seems 
to have been searching in the wrong place for normative considerations 
bearing on freedom of disposition in cases of discriminatory charitable 
trusts; after all, as a general rule motivations are irrelevant to questions 
78. Re Ramsden Estate, supra note 23 at para 13.
79. University of Victoria, supra note 23.
80. Ibid at para 25.
81. Castanera, supra note 23.
82. Ibid.
83. Ibid at para 37.
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relating to the construction and validity of trusts. Arguably, Canadian 
courts have some way to go before they identify those expressive and 
teleological considerations that truly bear on discriminatory charitable 
trusts.
III. Public Benefit
I ended Part II by suggesting that judges may need to develop the public 
policy doctrine in cases of discriminatory trusts so as to respond better to 
normative considerations that bear on the value of freedom of disposition. 
However, in cases of discriminatory charitable trusts, this need may not 
be an urgent one. In such cases, judges have at hand another theme — 
arising from equity’s historical jurisdiction over charity — that might 
prove capable of delivering nuanced responses without at the same time 
demanding that judges reflect on the value of freedom of disposition. This 
is the theme of public benefit. It is, of course, well established in equity 
that a charitable trust must have a dominant or primary purpose that is, 
in some sense, a public benefit purpose. The jurisprudence on this public 
benefit requirement is large and complex, and in contemporary equity 
it may fairly be said that public benefit is the central organising idea in 
cases about charity.84 Thus, it is strange that the theme of public benefit 
is hardly ever deployed in judicial responses to discriminatory charitable 
trusts; as I discussed above, in the relatively few cases about such trusts, 
invocation of the theme of public policy is the norm. Equally, the theme 
of public benefit seems not to be prominent, even if it is present, in 
cases about charities that engage in discrimination in the provision of 
services.85 In this part, I will not speculate as to why the public benefit 
84. The most comprehensive contemporary treatment of the public benefit 
test is Jonathan Garton, Public Benefit in Charity Law (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2013) [Garton, Public Benefit].
85. Thus, there are references to public benefit in Bob Jones, supra note 76; 
Catholic Care (Diocese of Leeds) v Charity Commission for England and 
Wales, [2010] EWHC 520 (Ch); and St Margaret’s Children and Family 
Care Society v Office of the Scottish Charity Regulator (2014), App 02/13 
(Scottish Charity Appeals Panel) [St Margaret’s] (but ultimately each of 
these cases can be understood as having been decided on grounds other 
than the public benefit test).
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test has not been utilised by judges dealing with discriminatory charitable 
trusts. Rather, my aim is to offer some thoughts as to how the theme of 
public benefit might be developed by judges so as to respond to such 
trusts. I argue that the public benefit test contains resources on which 
judges may build in reasoning about public benefits and detriments 
associated with discriminatory charitable trusts. In particular, I suggest 
that public benefit jurisprudence might be developed to enable judges, in 
appropriate cases, to find that discriminatory charitable trusts are not of 
public benefit and should be interfered with on that basis.
The public benefit test has two components.86 First, in order to 
satisfy the test, a purpose must stand to benefit a class of persons that is 
sufficiently “public” in character. This component of the test is directed 
against trusts that stand to benefit classes of persons whose relations to 
each other take the form of family, employment or associational ties 
and are accordingly viewed in charity law as “private”;87 latterly, in some 
jurisdictions, it has also come to be directed against trusts that exclude the 
poor.88 Secondly, if a purpose is to satisfy the public benefit test, it must, 
if carried out, stand to benefit people, as opposed to causing detriment to 
people or having no discernible welfare implications one way or the other. 
In thinking about how a discriminatory charitable trust might be dealt 
with under the public benefit test, the first point to note is that, except in 
unusual cases, such a trust is likely to satisfy the “public” component of 
the test. As Adam Parachin has insightfully pointed out, trusts that stand 
to benefit only persons who share — or lack — some common element 
of human identity are not typically impugned by the “public” component 
of the public benefit test.89 And if they are so impugned, it is likely to be 
because the identity-based class that they stand to benefit is also restricted 
86. For fuller discussion of the two components of the public benefit test, see 
Harding, Charity Law, supra note 1 at 13-30.
87. See e.g. In Re Compton, [1945] Ch 123 (CA (Eng)); Oppenheim v Tobacco 
Securities Trust Co Ltd, [1951] AC 297 (HL).
88. R (Independent Schools Council) v Charity Commission for England and 
Wales, [2011] UKUT 421 (Upper Tribunal Tax and Chancery Chamber) 
[Independent Schools]; Charities and Trustee Investment (Scotland) Act, ASP 
2005, c 10, s 8(2)(b).
89. Parachin, “Public Benefit”, supra note 74 at 182-94. 
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based on family, employment or associational ties. Moreover, according 
to Parachin, judicial dicta to the effect that a purpose is “public” only 
where the class that stands to benefit from the purpose somehow reflects 
the character of the purpose should be read as applying only to purposes 
that meet the description “general public utility”; those dicta play no role 
in helping to explain why discriminatory charitable trusts might fail the 
public benefit test in cases about purposes that are not of “general public 
utility”.90
Parachin convincingly argues that if discriminatory charitable trusts 
are to fall foul of the public benefit test on account of their discriminatory 
character, it is in most cases likely to be because in some sense their purposes 
fail the “benefit” component of the public benefit test.91 However, the 
application of the “benefit” component in cases about discriminatory 
charitable trusts is complicated by the fact that such trusts are typically 
for purposes of types recognised as prima facie charitable in law. In the 
decided cases, discriminatory charitable trusts have usually been for the 
advancement of education, a type of purpose recognised as prima facie 
charitable since the time of the Statute of Elizabeth92 and one of the four 
heads of charity articulated by Lord Macnaghten in Commissioners for 
Special Purposes of Income Tax v Pemsel.93 It is not unreasonable to assert that 
the legal expression of a type of purpose as prima facie charitable indicates 
that there are strong reasons for thinking that the type of purpose in 
question stands to benefit people in well recognised and accepted ways.94 
This thought would seem to underpin the longstanding judicial practice 
of assuming or even presuming the benefit of purposes within certain 
heads of charity, a practice that continues in some jurisdictions even if it 
90. Ibid at 186-93, discussing dicta of Lord Simonds in Inland Revenue 
Commissioners v Baddeley, [1955] AC 572 (HL) at 592.
91. Parachin, “Public Benefit”, supra note 74 at 194-204.
92. Statute of Charitable Uses, 1601 (UK), 43 Eliz I, c 4.
93. [1891] AC 531 (HL) at 583 [Pemsel].
94. See Mary Synge’s description of judicial practice as informed by this 
proposition: Mary Synge, The ‘New’ Public Benefit Requirement: Making 
Sense of Charity Law? (Portland: Hart Publishing, 2015) at 22-23.
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is prohibited by statute in others.95 Thus, where a trust is for a purpose 
of a type recognised as prima facie charitable in law — for example, the 
advancement of education — there are strong reasons to think that the 
trust satisfies the “benefit” component of the public benefit test, even if 
it entails discrimination. How, then, might a judge make a finding that a 
discriminatory charitable trust lacks benefit in these circumstances?
Public benefit jurisprudence points to the answer to this question. 
That jurisprudence shows that, where appropriate, judges working with 
the “benefit” component of the public benefit test are prepared to shift their 
attention away from the general character of a purpose under scrutiny and 
towards the likely social effects of carrying out that particular purpose.96 
Often this emphasis on likely social effects will entail some engagement 
with evidence of such effects that the parties have put before the court. 
A preparedness to look to likely social effects may be discerned in some 
cases about purposes of types recognised as prima facie charitable in law, 
most obviously, purposes within the first three heads of charity articulated 
by Lord Macnaghten in Pemsel, viz., “relief of poverty”, “advancement 
of education”, and “advancement of religion”.97 For example, in In Re 
Macduff,98 Lord Rigby recognised that the purpose of teaching the art of 
theft, although in a general sense within the description of “advancement 
of education” and to that extent prima facie charitable, would nonetheless 
have undesirable social effects and therefore fail the “benefit” component 
of the public benefit test.99 Moreover, in cases arising under the fourth 
head of charity set out by Lord Macnaghten in Pemsel, “other purposes 
95. Judges are prohibited from presuming the benefit of purposes of certain 
types in England and Wales: Charities Act 2011 (UK), c 25, s 4(2); 
Scotland: Charities and Trustee Investment (Scotland) Act ASP 2005; and 
Northern Ireland: Charities Act (Northern Ireland) 2008 (NI), c 12, s 3, as 
amended by Charities Act (Northern Ireland) 2013 (NI), c 3, s 1.
96. Drawing on the language of Jonathan Garton’s taxonomy of public 
benefit, this shift might be described as one away from questions of 
“conceptual” benefit and towards questions of “demonstrable” benefit: 
Garton, Public Benefit, supra note 84 at paras 2.16-2.17.
97. Pemsel, supra note 93 at 583.
98. [1896] 2 Ch 451 (CA (Eng))
99. Ibid at 474.
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beneficial to the community”,100 judges have had no choice but to look 
to likely social effects when applying the public benefit test, because the 
fourth head does not refer to a type of purpose regarded as prima facie 
charitable in law beyond pointing judges in the direction of the public 
benefit test. The best illustration of judges grappling with likely social 
effects in a case arising under the fourth head is National Anti-Vivisection 
Society v Inland Revenue Commissioners.101 There, the House of Lords was 
asked to determine whether the purposes of a society that campaigned for 
laws to prohibit scientists from performing experiments on live animals 
satisfied the public benefit test. Among the reasons for decision was that 
the “benefit” component of the public benefit test was not satisfied. In 
reaching this finding, the Law Lords considered evidence of likely social 
effects in the form of the frustration of advances in medical research on 
the one hand, and the cultivation of humane sentiments on the other, and 
they concluded that evidence of the former effects was more compelling 
than evidence of the latter.102
Thus, public benefit jurisprudence shows that judges may look to 
the likely social effects of carrying out the purposes of discriminatory 
charitable trusts when applying the “benefit” component of the public 
benefit test to such trusts. And they may do this even in cases where 
the purposes of the trusts in question are of types that are recognised as 
prima facie charitable in law. But now another question presents itself. 
This question may be better grasped in light of a crude taxonomy of the 
social effects that might be generated by carrying out a purpose. This 
taxonomy is made up of two categories. The first contains what might 
be called “direct” social effects. So, for example, a trust for the purpose 
of providing educational scholarships to “white Protestant boys” might, 
when carried out, give educational opportunities to children within 
that class and at the same time deny other children outside the class 
similar educational opportunities. Carrying out the purpose of the trust 
is, in a sense, an immediate cause of these outcomes: to this extent, the 
outcomes fall within the category of direct social effects. In the second 
100. Pemsel, supra note 93 at 583.
101. [1948] AC 31 (HL) [Anti-Vivisection].
102. Ibid at 48-49, per Lord Wright.
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category are what might be called “indirect” social effects. So, to return 
to the example, the purpose of providing educational scholarships to 
“white Protestant boys” might, depending on the circumstances in which 
it is carried out, express attitudes and beliefs about certain identity-based 
groups that demean members of those groups, and those expressive effects 
might be felt in public culture irrespective of the impact of carrying out 
the purpose on children whose educational opportunities are directly 
affected, for good or ill, by the discrimination entailed in the purpose.
The question that is illuminated by this crude taxonomy of social 
effects is this: to what extent should indirect social effects be taken into 
account, along with direct social effects, in the setting of an inquiry 
into whether some discriminatory charitable trust satisfies the “benefit” 
component of the public benefit test? This question about indirect social 
effects is of general importance in public benefit jurisprudence, but it is 
of particular importance in cases about discriminatory charitable trusts 
because, according to many philosophers, discrimination has considerable 
indirect social effects that help to explain why it ought to be of moral 
and legal concern.103 Indeed, in certain cases, whether a discriminatory 
charitable trust satisfies or fails the public benefit test might turn on the 
extent to which the indirect social effects of discrimination are taken 
into account. For example, return once more to the example of a trust 
for providing educational scholarships to “white Protestant boys”, and 
imagine that the evidence shows clearly that students excluded from this 
class suffer no loss of educational opportunity as a result of that exclusion, 
perhaps because they remain eligible for a range of other scholarships 
that are not discriminatory in the same way. In these circumstances, the 
“benefit” component of the public benefit test seems clearly satisfied if 
only direct social effects are taken into account, but the position seems far 
103. For detailed discussion, see Harding, Charity Law, supra note 1 at 226-33.
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more complex once indirect social effects are brought into view.104
There are indications in the public benefit jurisprudence that judges 
are sometimes reluctant to take into account indirect social effects when 
working with the “benefit” component of the public benefit test. For 
example, in R (Independent Schools Council) v Charity Commission for 
England and Wales105 (“Independent Schools”), the Upper Tribunal (Tax 
and Chancery) was invited to find that the purposes of independent fee-
charging schools were not of public benefit because they contributed to 
inequality and social division in British society.106 The Tribunal noted 
the force in such arguments but declined to take such claimed indirect 
social effects into account in applying the public benefit test. For the 
Tribunal, the evidence presented on the question of indirect social effects 
was not substantial enough to influence inquiries into public benefit; 
moreover, to make findings on the basis of evidence of the indirect social 
effects of private schools would be to venture onto political territory that 
was properly the province of the legislature.107 But if Independent Schools 
reveals judicial wariness about indirect social effects, there are also cases 
on public benefit that indicate a different judicial attitude. In Re Resch,108 
for example, the Privy Council accepted the proposition that a private 
hospital stood to benefit the public because the private hospital relieved 
104. See St Margaret’s, supra note 85 at 12, 22-29 (where the Panel was asked, 
inter alia, whether the purposes of an adoption agency that excluded same 
sex couples from its services satisfied the public benefit test. In finding 
that the public benefit test was satisfied, the Panel made no reference to 
the indirect social effects of discrimination. Instead, the Panel focused 
on direct social effects, noting that no same sex couples had ever sought 
the services offered by the agency in question and that same sex couples 
seeking adoption services had a range of other agencies to choose from). 
In contrast, see Catholic Care (Diocese of Leeds) v The Charity Commission 
for England and Wales, [2011] UKFTT B1 (First Tier Tribunal General 
Regulatory Chamber) at para 59 (where the Tribunal acknowledged the 
indirect social effects of discrimination against same sex couples in the 
provision of adoption services).
105. Independent Schools, supra note 88.
106. Ibid at para 29.
107. Ibid at paras 96-109.
108. [1969] 1 AC 514 (PC (Austl)).
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public hospitals and therefore the state of the burden of health care.109 
And in Neville Estates Ltd v Madden110 (“Neville Estates”), Justice Cross 
considered that the purposes of a synagogue closed to the public satisfied 
the public benefit test because worshippers would leave the synagogue 
and go out into the community, thereby generating benefit to the public 
(albeit in ways that were not well explained in the judgment).111
Of course, in Re Resch and Neville Estates, purposes that ostensibly 
failed the public benefit test were ultimately found to satisfy the test once 
indirect social effects were taken into account. In contrast, if indirect 
social effects are to be taken into account when applying the “benefit” 
component of the public benefit test to discriminatory charitable trusts, 
then a purpose that ostensibly satisfies the public benefit test may 
ultimately be found to fail the test after those indirect social effects are 
taken into account. But it is not the outcomes in Re Resch and Neville 
Estates that are of present interest: it is the method adopted in those cases. 
The cases show that public benefit jurisprudence contains resources for 
judges who are minded to take into account indirect social effects in 
working out whether discriminatory charitable trusts satisfy the “benefit” 
component of the public benefit test. In light of these resources, judges 
may apply the “benefit” component of the public benefit test in a way 
that is sensitive to benefits associated with a discriminatory charitable 
purpose (including, importantly, benefits indicated by the fact that the 
purpose is of a type recognised as prima facie charitable in law), but at 
the same time takes into account both direct and indirect adverse social 
effects associated with the discrimination entailed in the purpose. These 
latter effects may be described, using the language of public benefit 
jurisprudence, as detriments to be taken into account in working out 
whether the “benefit” component of the public benefit test is met.
Earlier, I argued that, in cases of discriminatory charitable trusts, 
judges applying the public policy doctrine must balance the value of 
freedom of disposition, which is properly viewed as a function of the 
expressive and teleological aspects of choices entailed in the exercise of 
109. Ibid.
110. [1962] Ch 832 (Eng) [Neville Estates].
111. Ibid.
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that freedom, against the value of equality. Now we are in a position to 
see that judges who sought to apply the public benefit test in such cases 
would also be required to undertake a balancing exercise. In the setting 
of the public benefit test, the balancing exercise would be one according 
to which benefits associated with the purpose of a discriminatory 
charitable trust must be weighed against the detriments associated with 
the discrimination entailed in carrying out that purpose. As with the 
treatment of indirect social effects, public benefit jurisprudence offers 
judges some guidance in undertaking such a balancing exercise. In Anti-
Vivisection, for example, the House of Lords placed emphasis on tangible 
and material social effects in finding that detriments associated with the 
frustration of advances in medical research outweighed benefits associated 
with the cultivation of humane sentiments.112 But such guidance can only 
take judges so far; after a point, public benefit jurisprudence is vague as 
to how benefits and detriments ought to be weighed. Indeed, as I have 
argued elsewhere, the most plausible reading of Anti-Vivisection is one 
according to which the Law Lords experienced the balancing exercise as 
demanding a political choice between incommensurable considerations 
of value.113
That an application of the public benefit test in cases of discriminatory 
charitable trusts may lead to judges having to make choices between 
incommensurables should not be counted as a shortcoming in the public 
benefit jurisprudence; rather, it should be seen as a necessary consequence 
of the nature of what judges are asked to balance when working with 
112. Anti-Vivisection, supra note 101 at 48-49, per Lord Wright.
113. See Harding, Charity Law, supra note 1 at 25.
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that jurisprudence.114 A robust public benefit jurisprudence dealing with 
discriminatory charitable trusts would recognise this fact. However, 
at the same time such jurisprudence would seek to provide reasoned 
accounts of the various benefits and detriments associated with such 
trusts. And in light of these reasoned accounts, judges might be able to 
identify circumstances in which discriminatory charitable trusts either 
clearly fail or clearly satisfy the “benefit” component of the public benefit 
test notwithstanding the incommensurable character of the benefits and 
detriments associated with them.115 For example, the benefits associated 
with the purpose of such a trust might be relatively modest but significant 
detriments might be associated with its discriminatory terms; equally, 
there might be evidence of substantial benefits associated with the purpose 
of a trust but only negligible evidence of detriments associated with the 
discrimination entailed in that purpose. Moreover, even in cases where 
it is unclear how to balance incommensurable benefits and detriments 
associated with a discriminatory charitable trust, reasoned accounts of 
those benefits and detriments may be expected at least to give judges a 
clearer sense of what is at stake in their choices.
114. See also Parachin, “Public Benefit”, supra note 74 at 204-205 (Parachin 
suggests that the balancing of incommensurables that is required if the 
public benefit test is to be applied to discriminatory charitable trusts takes 
judges beyond “the traditionally conceived boundaries of the judicial 
realm”. This may be true, but as cases like Anti-Vivisection show, it is in 
the very nature of the public benefit test that it requires judges to make 
political choices among incommensurables; for as long as judges must 
apply that test when working out whether purposes are charitable in law, 
they must venture beyond the “traditionally conceived boundaries” to 
which Parachin refers).
115. This may be possible where the incommensurability of such benefits 
and detriments is, in Timothy Endicott’s language, “vague” rather 
than “radical”. Vague incommensurables may be compared with each 
other; sometimes the outcome of this comparison will be clear, but 
in a range of cases it will not. Radical incommensurables cannot be 
compared with each other. See Timothy Endicott, “Proportionality and 
Incommensurability” (2012) Oxford Legal Studies Research Paper No 40. 
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IV. Conclusion
A public benefit jurisprudence that took into account both direct and 
indirect social effects, and that demanded a balancing exercise in cases 
where such social effects took the form of both benefits and detriments, 
would be a useful instrument for judges seeking to respond in nuanced 
ways to discriminatory charitable trusts. That said, as I argued earlier, the 
public policy doctrine, at least where it rests on a sound understanding 
of the value of freedom of disposition, is also a useful instrument for 
such judges. At the same time, both the public policy doctrine and the 
public benefit test demand that competing considerations be weighed 
against each other, and a balance struck between them, in the setting of 
discriminatory charitable trusts: in the case of the public policy doctrine, 
it is the values of freedom of disposition and equality; in the case of the 
public benefit test it is the various benefits and detriments associated 
with the purpose of a discriminatory charitable trust. Given that both 
the public policy doctrine and the public benefit test seem fit, or at least 
might be rendered fit, for dealing with discriminatory charitable trusts, 
and given that neither tool is able to avoid the difficulties associated with 
balancing competing considerations, it is worth asking whether anything 
would be gained if judges ceased reaching for the theme of public policy 
when deciding cases about discriminatory charitable trusts, and started 
reaching for the theme of public benefit in its place.
One possible advantage is that, by reaching for the theme of public 
benefit, judges might be able to respond to, and in appropriate cases 
interfere with, discriminatory charitable trusts without at the same time 
engaging with the value of freedom of disposition. Earlier, I argued 
that this value might be misunderstood as having nothing to do with 
the expressive or teleological aspects of choices that are entailed in the 
exercise of dispositive freedom. To the extent that judges misunderstand 
the value of freedom of disposition in this way, there is a risk that they 
will attribute weight to that value in circumstances where no or less 
weight ought to be attributed to it. Consequently, discriminatory trusts 
might be upheld in circumstances where they should rather be interfered 
with. But if judges turn to the theme of public benefit when dealing with 
discriminatory charitable trusts, then at least in cases about discriminatory 
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charitable trusts judges will not have to consider the value of freedom of 
disposition; after all, the public benefit test is uninterested in that value. 
To that extent, the risk will be minimised that a misunderstanding of the 
value of dispositive freedom might affect the treatment of discriminatory 
charitable trusts.
However, at the same time a different risk might be realised. If 
judges come to think that discriminatory charitable trusts are a matter 
for public benefit jurisprudence, and that discriminatory “private” trusts 
are a matter for the public policy doctrine, then they may assume, as 
Tarnopolsky JA did in Canada Trust, that the reason why discriminatory 
charitable trusts are subject to equality norms is that they are in some 
sense “public” trusts, and on the basis of this assumption they may 
conclude that discriminatory “private” trusts are not subject to equality 
norms because of their “private” character. Earlier I argued that there is 
no reason to think that dispositions of a “private” character are necessarily 
exempt from equality norms that operate in the public sphere: such 
norms are relevant to understanding and evaluating the expressive and 
teleological dimensions of the choices entailed in “private” dispositions 
just as they are relevant to understanding those dimensions of the choices 
entailed in “public” dispositions. In truth, both charitable and “private” 
trusts that discriminate are subject to equality norms because the value 
of exercises of freedom of disposition that underpin them is, in part, 
to be understood in light of such norms. In addition, discriminatory 
charitable trusts are subject to equality norms via the public benefit test. 
So judges exercising equity’s jurisdiction over charity are spoilt for choice 
in deciding how to give legal expression to the equality norms that apply 
to discriminatory charitable trusts. Judges exercising equity’s jurisdiction 
over “private” trusts do not enjoy this luxury. In these circumstances, 
far from eschewing the public policy doctrine in favour of the public 
benefit test, there may be a case for judges exercising equity’s jurisdiction 
over charity to eschew the public benefit test and continue, as they have 
done to date, to invoke the theme of public policy when interfering with 
discriminatory charitable trusts. In this way, such judges may ensure that 
a legal basis is maintained for interfering with discriminatory trusts of all 
types, whether charitable or “private” in character.
